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THE PRIVATIZATION OF CIVIL JUSTICE: AN EXPOSITION 
ON NEW YORK’S PROMPT PAYMENT LAW AND ITS 
IMPOSITION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
James M. Tsimis
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a world of constant flux and fluctuation, one rule generally 
remained invariable: arbitration required the mutual assent of both 
parties.  It seems, however, that all good and simple things come to 
an end.  In 2009, the New York State legislature amended the Prompt 
Payment Law with the objective of establishing a default rule that 
prescribes the manner with which providers of construction services 
are compensated for the work and services they provide.1  The legis-
lature observed that, generally, those who receive construction ser-
vices and the providers that render them “contract freely and, in good 
faith, meet their obligations in a timely and just manner.”2  Neverthe-
less, the crux of the legislation addresses the concern of undue delay 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  2009, Stony 
Brook University, B.A. in Anthropology.  I wish to thank my supportive family and friends 
for a lifetime of unwavering encouragement and understanding in all my endeavors, but es-
pecially so over the last two years.  Additionally, I would like to thank Michael Mulqueen 
who was the impetus and inspiration for this Comment and whose support was steadfast dur-
ing my summer under his tutelage.  Finally, I must thank Timothy Riselvato, as well as the 
rest of the talented Touro Law Review staff, who were integral to this Comment‟s publica-
tion. 
1 Editor‟s Notes to N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756 (CONSOL. 2010) (describing legislative in-
tent). 
2 Id.  Most sophisticated construction contracts are, at a minimum, fundamentally derived 
from form contracts as provided for by the American Institute for Architects, and most—if 
not all—include arbitration provisions.  Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Alter-
native Dispute Resolution in Real Estate Matters: The New York Experience, 11 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 437, 451 n.41 (2010).  Where a contract exists that dictates the terms be-
tween the parties, the default rules of the Prompt Payment Law need not apply.  Editor‟s 
Notes to GEN. BUS. § 756. 
1
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of payments for approved services in the construction industry.3  
Moreover, the law provides for the authorization of “remedies includ-
ing reasonable interest payments and circumstances for stop work 
provisions.”4  The legislature explained that: 
it is the intent of this legislation to encourage parties to 
construction contracts to make payments at least as 
expeditiously as existing contracts require and further 
reduce existing payment processing time wherever 
feasible, while at the same time permitting such enti-
ties to contract freely, perform proper and reasonable 
management and financial oversight activities de-
signed to ensure that construction services are pro-
vided in a safe, efficient and fiscally prudent manner.5 
Thus, for private construction projects worth over $150,000,6 
this law is designed to assuage the anxieties of those engaging in, and 
soliciting the business of, construction providers.  This law is an     
attempt to promote a market with safeguards and regulation.  This 
law assures that compensation is justly dispersed.  Yet this law, the 
author argues, is unconstitutional. 
While the Prompt Payment Law is not wholly egregious, its 
flagrancy nevertheless stems from section 756-b.7  The statute pro-
vides that any violation of the prompt payment conditions may be 
settled by “binding  arbitration at the request of the „aggrieved par-
ty. ‟ ” 8  The statute provides as follows: First, violations must be 
brought to the written attention of the party who is alleged to have 
violated the statute by the other “aggrieved” party who claims the vi-
olation.9  After receipt of that notice, the parties should attempt to re-
 
3 Id.  Timely payments create a more productive and efficient work environment and can 
drastically reduce both external and internal transactional costs.  Id. 
4 Id.  Stop work provisions allow the contractor or subcontractor to do as the name sug-
gests—stop work—but more importantly, it gives the construction provider leverage against 
the party with whom disagreement or conflict exists because stopping work will inevitably 
incur additional expenses on behalf of the defaulting party. 
5  Id. (describing legislative intent). 
6  Editor‟s Notes to N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756.  The previous version of the Prompt Pay-
ment Law called for the price of the project to be $250,000 or greater so as to trigger the sta-
tute.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756 (2002), amended by N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756 (2009). 
7 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756-b. 
8 Neal M. Eiseman & Robert J. MacPherson, Mandatory Arbitration in Construction 
Payment Disputes, 243 N.Y. L.J. 4, 4 (2010). 
9 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756-b(3)(a). 
2
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solve the matter on their own volition.10  In the event that no resolu-
tion can be agreed upon, the “aggrieved” party then has fifteen days 
from the time the other party receives the written notice to initiate “an 
expedited arbitration pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association.”11 
Quite obviously, the procedure just described is inherently 
problematic.  For instance, the party receiving the notice may not 
consent to the arbitration—that is, he may not wish to waive his right 
to a jury trial should one be afforded to him.  Furthermore, any exist-
ing contract between the parties, whether memorialized in written 
form or not and absent provisions to the contrary, may implicitly and 
impliedly reflect that any disputes arising from or relating to the con-
tract shall be resolved in a court of law.12  Irrespective of those under-
lying contractual connotations, however, the arbitrator, according to 
the statute, will then render his or her decision to the parties with re-
spect to the alleged violation, and “the award of the arbitrator shall be 
final,”13 leaving the only effective means of vacating the arbitrator‟s 
final decision by way of C.P.L.R. Section 7501.14  Thus, this provi-
sion of the Prompt Payment Law provides for the aggrieved party‟s 
redress at the expense of the other party‟s constitutional rights. 
Adding teeth to this provision, section 757 states that any 
proviso “affecting a construction contract [which states] that expe-
dited arbitration as expressly provided for and in the manner estab-
lished by section seven hundred fifty-six-b of this article is unavaila-
 
10 Id. at § 756-b(3)(a)(vii) (“Upon receipt of written notice of a complaint . . . the parties 
shall attempt to resolve the matter giving rise to such complaint.”). 
11 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756-b(3)(c). 
12 See Eiseman & MacPherson, supra note 8 (describing the way in which a party com-
pelled to arbitrate may not have contemplated it at all). 
13 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756-b(3)(e). 
14 See id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (CONSOL. 2010).  Section 7501 states: 
A written agreement to submit any controversy thereafter arising 
or any existing controversy to arbitration is enforceable without 
regard to the justiciable character of the controversy and confers 
jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it and to enter 
judgment on an award.  In determining any matter arising under 
this article, the court shall not consider whether the claim with re-
spect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass 
upon the merits of the dispute. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501.  A looming question, therefore, is what if the parties never agreed to 
arbitrate? 
3
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ble to one or both parties” is void and unenforceable.15  As a result, 
any party attempting to circumvent the statute‟s imposition of arbitra-
tion is frustrated by section 757. 
Forcing parties to mandatory, binding arbitration runs counter 
to parties‟ rights to a jury trial and due process as provided for in both 
the Federal and New York Constitutions.16  Therein lies the irony, 
however: the Prompt Payment Law is clearly a statute that is de-
signed to reduce the burden of the courts by encouraging arbitra-
tion—yet its intrinsic egregiousness may well thrust the parties into 
the very courts it was designed to prevent them from entering.  A 
contractor or owner will very likely contest the validity of the law‟s 
draconian imposition of arbitration. 
For these reasons, this article will expose the Prompt Payment 
Law‟s brazen constitutional transgressions.  Section II will offer a 
backdrop of the three alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that 
are most prevalent, and will discuss that which differentiates them.  
Section III exposes how companies utilize arbitration to their advan-
tage, and how it is sometimes an abuse of constitutional rights.  Sec-
tion IV endeavors to chronicle the Supreme Court‟s preference for 
arbitration, its influence on New York, and how arbitration is adverse 
to the Seventh Amendment and New York‟s analog, as well as the 
due process implications of both Federal and New York‟s Constitu-
tions.  Finally, Section V concludes this Article with a proposition for 
how arbitration should be interpreted and where it fits in the twenty-
first century. 
II.  THE TOOLS OF THE TRADE THAT COMPRISE ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Negotiation 
Arbitration is but one tool in a vast toolbox of alternative dis-
pute resolution devices available to resolve conflicts between con-
tracting parties.  Negotiation and mediation are two other popular 
dispute resolution techniques that are effective, but do not have the 
same consequence as does arbitration, namely because they are non-
 
15 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 757(3) (CONSOL. 2010). 
16 See Eiseman & MacPherson, supra note 8 (foreseeing a string of litigation due to the 
constitutional implications of the Prompt Payment Law). 
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binding.17  Negotiation, for instance, can be rather informal because it 
occurs between the parties with no outside help.18  Moreover, negoti-
ations need not take place only when a problem arises; often, terms 
are bargained for through some form of negotiation before a contract 
is even executed.19  The relationship between parties can consist of a 
constant ebb and flow of negotiations, and it does not matter whether 
or not a contract has already been signed.  The reality is that most 
transactions revolve around some form of negotiation, and in the con-
text of dispute resolution, it is a simple yet effective tool that may re-
sult in an expeditious solution.20 
Mediation 
Slightly more formal is the dispute resolution tool of media-
tion, which, by its nature, requires not only the parties at the table, 
but also a neutral third person facilitating a civil and objective resolu-
tion.21  Hence, mediation is frequently called “facilitated negotia-
tion.”22  Often, courts will require some form of mediation prior to 
filing with the court, which, in such a context, provides a valuation 
for what a case is worth.23 
In order for mediation to be successful, the parties must truly 
intend to make amends.24  A mediator‟s role is to encourage open 
communication between the disputing parties so as to come to a mu-
tual resolution.25  Rather than impressing upon the parties a half-
hearted resolution, the mediator‟s goal is to inspire a creative solution 
 
17 Lebovits & Hidalgo, supra note 2, at 439-41 (discussing the pros and cons of negotia-
tion, mediation and arbitration).  The authors further note that, with regard to negotiation, 
“[t]he parties in dispute attempt to reach an agreement using their negotiating skills and leve-
rage.”  Id. at 439.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. (“The advantage of negotiation over other ADR techniques is that parties that nego-
tiate can eliminate the cost associated with a third-party neutral (if any) and overcome adver-
sarial bias.”). 
21 Lebovits & Hidalgo, supra note 2, at 440-41. 
22 Id. at 440; see also Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strate-
gies, and Techniques, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996). 
23 Lebovits & Hidalgo, supra note 2, at 440. 
24 Id. at 441 (stating that the parties must have a “genuine intention to reach an agreement 
[otherwise] mediation will fail.  Mediation is not advisable when . . . one side is unreasona-
ble, when one side has a decidedly superior legal position, or when the parties are so antago-
nistic that concessions between them are not viable.”). 
25 Id. at 440. 
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that is satisfactory to all the parties involved.26  Any conclusion to the 
conflict between the parties as a result of mediation will only be the 
product of voluntary, consensual agreement.27  Thus, mediation main-
tains the spirit of willingness associated with negotiation, but is more 
structured and formal. 
Arbitration 
Finally, in the continuum of formality of dispute resolution 
tools, arbitration is the most formal and consequential—it is binding 
adjudication.28  There are, indeed, compelling benefits associated 
with voluntary arbitration.  First, the parties must agree that if a dis-
pute were to arise between them during the life of the contract, then 
arbitration would be the choice of adjudication to which they would 
agree to resolve the conflict.  Therefore, when a signed agreement be-
tween parties contains an arbitration clause, it is presumably there 
because it was consensually approved by them, and is thus, volunta-
ry.  The venue of the arbitration, the neutral arbitrator, and the rules 
which shall govern are matters which should be mutually agreed 
upon by the parties.29 
Secondly, arbitration is private and the decision of the arbitra-
tor is not made public.30  For those who cherish their privacy, arbitra-
tion can be an invaluable alternative.  Finally, arbitration is a more 
expeditious process than litigation, and as a result, arbitration is, by 
and large, faster and cheaper—a benefit that does not require further 
explanation.31  Beware, however, because the old adage, “you get 
what you pay for,” rings especially true here. 
 
26 Id.; see also James J. Alfini, Mediation as a Calling: Addressing the Disconnect Be-
tween Mediation Ethics and the Practices of Lawyer Mediators, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 829, 831 
(2008) (“[S]elf-determination . . . is the one value that distinguishes mediation from other 
dispute resolution processes.”). 
27 Lebovits & Hidalgo, supra note 2, at 441. 
28 Id. (“The arbitrators‟ ruling or award is ultimately binding on the parties just as it were 
rendered by a court as a final judgment.”). 
29 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961) (call-
ing this type of arrangement “individuated arbitration, [wherein] the making of all arrange-
ments, including the procedures for arbitration, rests entirely with the parties concerned”). 
30 Id.  In addition to the privacy that arbitration provides, there is also the fact that experts 
in the relevant field act as arbitrators in the matter, as well as “the random acceptance by 
many businessmen of the idea that arbitration is faster and less expensive than court action.”  
Id. 
31 Id. 
6
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In any event, that which most differentiates negotiation and 
mediation from arbitration is that the latter‟s effects are binding; that 
is, a party may not appeal the arbitrator‟s decision in a court of law.32  
Arbitration has its own set of rules, and as such, it need not follow 
substantive law.33  Arbitration does not have the power to hold parties 
in contempt or award punitive damages.34  An arbitrator can essen-
tially employ his subjective notions of justice, without any rationali-
ty, yet purport to be objective in his outcome.  To much dismay, these 
truths are what the Supreme Court and the New York Court of Ap-
peals favor.35 
Exposing Arbitration: The “Repeat” Theories 
Aside from the intuitive problems that are inherent with arbi-
tration, there are two other understated issues that warrant attention.  
First is the “repeat provider” theory, which explains that organiza-
tions that repeatedly provide arbitration services for companies that 
include arbitration clauses in contracts with consumers and em-
ployees do not have a financial incentive to arbitrate dispassionately, 
but rather to settle cases before them in a manner that is most benefi-
cial to the companies that ultimately pay the arbitration fees.36  The 
American Arbitration Association and the National Arbitration Fo-
rum are but two arbitration organizations that have agreements with 
 
32 In reality, a party may in fact appeal an arbitrator‟s award, but under only under limited 
circumstances as prescribed by C.P.L.R. Article 75.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 
(CONSOL. 2010). 
33 See Matthew Savare, Clauses in Conflict: Can an Arbitration Provision Eviscerate a 
Choice-of-Law Clause?, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 598 (2005); see also Lentine v. Funda-
ro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1972) (“Absent provision to the contrary in the arbitration 
agreement, arbitrators are not bound by principles of substantive law or rules of evidence.”). 
34 Lawrence N. Gray, Judiciary and Penal Law Contempt in New York: A Critical Analy-
sis, 3 J.L. & POL‟Y 81, 84-86 (1994) (noting that only judges can hold a party in contempt). 
35 See generally, Moses H. Cone Mem‟l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 5 
(1983) (discussing the finality and binding effect of arbitration decisions); Weinrott v. Carp, 
298 N.E.2d 42, 45 (N.Y. 1973) (“ „Once it be ascertained that the parties broadly agree to 
arbitrate a dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement, it is for the arbitrators 
to decide what the agreement means and to enforce it according to the rules of law which 
they deem appropriate in the circumstances.‟ ” (quoting Matter of Exercycle Corp. (Maratta), 
174 N.E.2d 463, 464 (N.Y. 1961))). 
36 Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 
1650 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration] (“Arbitration organi-
zations . . . are now competing to provide arbitration services for particular companies that 
require their consumers to arbitrate future disputes. . . .  Obviously, once an entity is named 
as the provider, financial benefits accrue to that provider.”). 
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various large companies that name them as the provider of their arbi-
tration services.37  These organizations earn fees, either as a percen-
tage of the amount charged by the arbitrators or, at the very least, 
administrative fees.38  However one rationalizes it, the arbitration or-
ganizations and the companies that hire them are very likely to get a 
gluttonous slice of some financial pie. 
The second trend is known as the “repeat player” bias.39  As 
the name suggests, the companies that repeatedly include arbitration 
clauses in their contracts are more likely to arbitrate against a multi-
tude of customers or employees.40  The companies thus garner much 
more experience and inevitably become more adept at handling the 
arbitration proceedings.41  Conversely, consumers and employees are 
less likely to arbitrate a matter more than once in their lifetime as op-
posed to a large company, and the “repeat player” theory suggests 
that familiarity with the process can either be beneficial or detrimen-
tal to the success of the arbitration, depending on which side of the 
table one sits.42 
Notwithstanding the benefits of arbitration when it is chosen 
voluntarily between parties, the negatives associated with involuntary 
mandatory arbitration are too severe to be forced on any party by sta-
tute.  The language of the Prompt Payment Law reads that the ag-
grieved party has the option to arbitrate, as evidenced through the use 
of the non-mandatory language of “may.”43  Proponents of the statute 
may argue that this language mitigates the mandating effect that the 
statute imposes on the other party because it is ultimately the ag-
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (“[P]roviders have a financial incentive to make sure that the company is pleased 
with the results in arbitration.”). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1651. 
42 Id. at 1651; see also Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the 
Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 223, 239 (1998) (“[T]he perception of fairness is as important as the reality”). 
43 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756(b)(3)(c) (2010).  The relevant portion of the statute is repro-
duced here: 
If efforts to resolve such matter to the satisfaction of all parties are un-
successful, the aggrieved party may refer the matter, not less than fifteen 
days of the receipt of third party verification of delivery of the com-
plaint, to the American Arbitration Association for an expedited arbitra-
tion pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. 
Id. 
8
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grieved party‟s choice.  This argument, of course, has no merit.  It is 
the statute which enables the aggrieved party to force the other to ar-
bitrate in the first place.44  Without this language, the aggrieved party 
would not have the statutory option to single-handedly arbitrate, and 
might otherwise go to court as previously imagined by the parties. 
If the parties do not negotiate a conflict resolution clause in 
their contract voluntarily, arbitration should not be intrusively im-
posed on any party by the legislature, and should not be the default 
rule under any circumstances.  The Prompt Payment Law violates the 
right to a jury trial and the right to due process, both of which are 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.45 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OPTIONAL 
Today‟s backdrop of civil litigation is drastically different 
than the backdrop existing when the Constitution was drafted.  The 
Constitution guarantees that civil litigants have a right to due process 
of law46 and the right of trial by jury.47  More modern statutes and 
rules assure that the parties in litigation conduct discovery in order to 
inform the opposing parties of the other‟s evidence and to limit sur-
prises in court as much as possible.48  A neutral judge or jury then 
hears the facts and weighs the evidence, and judgment is rendered 
based on the pertinent law.49  If the losing party finds that error was 
made, he can appeal to a higher court which can review the law as 
applied to the facts, and if substantial error is found, the higher court 
can reverse the judgment.50  The process just summarized describes 
the judicial system, which affords an even playing field for all parties 
 
44 See id. (stating that the aggrieved party is responsible for referring the matter to the 
American Bar Association). 
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Id. 
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
49 See generally, Right to a Jury Trial, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 519 (2008) 
(discussing the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and neutral jury). 
50 See FED. R. APP. P. 3 (explaining the process for appeal as of right). 
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involved, thereby assuring just outcomes. 
Times change, and with time so did the application of those 
aforementioned constitutional rights.  Many contracts today contain 
alternative dispute resolution provisions.51  The “alternative” is a 
binding resolution outside of the so-called cumbersome court system, 
but it is not always justice.  Companies, small and large alike, include 
such provisions in their employment contracts because it is often less 
expensive to arbitrate than it is to engage in the prolonged and expen-
sive process of filing a lawsuit.  Employees who sign these contracts, 
however, have little option but to agree to these provisions because 
the initial offers are presented to them in a “take it or leave it” fa-
shion.  Oftentimes, some form of arbitration is agreed to even though 
there may exist a huge disparity of bargaining power between the 
parties.52 
Proponents of arbitration claim that it is preferred over litiga-
tion because it is less expensive, especially for an employee bringing 
suit against a large corporation who might have refused to do so if 
faced with the prohibitive expense of hiring an attorney and filing a 
lawsuit.  Nonetheless, the expense is still high for less affluent em-
ployees that bring arbitration against their employer “big-company” 
because arbitrators may charge up to $5,000 per day in certain in-
stances.53  Moreover, attorney‟s fees are not recoverable in arbitra-
tion.54  It is even more expensive when one considers the inferior val-
ue one receives through arbitration as opposed to the value one 
receives from litigating in court, where the arbiter is a truly neutral 
judge bound by the law of the land. 
Ultimately, however, parties under these employment-
contract circumstances agree to them and are bound by them—that is, 
 
51 See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1639 (“It is difficult 
to assess how common mandatory arbitration clauses have become, but they certainly seem 
ubiquitous.”). 
52 See, e.g., Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“While inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees is not alone suf-
ficient to hold arbitration agreements unenforceable, such inequality, when coupled with 
high pressure tactics that coerce an employee's acceptance of onerous terms, may be suffi-
cient to show that an employee lacked a meaningful choice.”  (internal citations omitted)). 
53 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 729, 738 (2006) (illustrating arbitrators‟ fees from the American Arbitration 
Association in Table 1). 
54 See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1641-43 (“Compa-
nies are increasingly using their arbitration clause not only to require arbitration but also to 
further limit consumers‟ procedural and even substantive rights.”). 
10
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a prospective employee has the opportunity to walk away from a con-
tract before signing it, or at least attempt to amend a clause so as to 
tip it more in her favor.  The employee is ostensibly cognizant of the 
possibility of arbitration because of its mention in the contract, and 
when such a contract is signed in an employment setting, there is less 
sympathy for the employee because she presumably knew the risks 
beforehand.  Accordingly, employment arbitration agreements are of-
ten upheld in the name of efficiency and in accord with precedent.55 
Notwithstanding the Constitution‟s limitations, however, 
some state legislatures enacted legislation that not only promote arbi-
tration, but, in fact, mandate it.56  Arbitration essentially embodies the 
privatization of the judicial system.57  Such privatization runs counter 
to the safeguards that the Constitution provides and is an egregious 
violation thereto.  As one commentator put it, “[the Constitution] 
precludes the state from helping one party require another to give up 
her day in court in favor of an arbitration process that is unfair or that 
deprives an unwitting party of her right to a jury or a life-tenured 
judge.”58  This succinctly encapsulates what the New York State Leg-
islature has done through the Prompt Payment Act. 
IV.  THE PROMPT PAYMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION IN A 
 CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Interpreting the Securities Act of 1933, the Supreme Court 
decided Wilko v. Swan,59 where it ruled that arbitration is less protec-
tive than litigation.60  The Court further stated that arbitration requires 
 
55 See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Prefe-
rence for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and 
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rethinking] 
(“Courts have apparently been so impressed by the value of arbitration that they have aban-
doned their purported practice of interpreting a statute according to its plain meaning, in or-
der to favor arbitration over litigation.”). 
56 Pennsylvania is the only state thus far that has legislation that compels parties to arbi-
trate regardless of either party‟s willingness to do so.  See 55 A.L.R.2d 432 (Originally pub-
lished in 1957). 
57 Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 55, at 6. 
58 Id. at 12-13 (noting that courts should honor an arbitration agreement between two 
businessmen who voluntarily decide to partake in it, but should otherwise be weary of arbi-
tration agreements wherein one party signs it unwittingly or without the full understanding 
that his substantive rights will be abridged). 
59 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 
U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
60 Id. at 436 (indicating that a substantial curbing of constitutional protections comes with 
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subjective findings that must not only be determined, but also applied 
“without judicial instruction on the law” and that the arbitrator‟s 
award “may be made without explanation of their reasons and with-
out a complete record of their proceedings, [and that] the arbitrators‟ 
conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as 
„burden of proof,‟ „reasonable care‟ or „material fact,‟ . . . cannot be 
examined.”61  Since then, the Court has taken a stance in diametric 
opposition to its reasoning in Wilko.  In the ensuing years, the Court 
began to flirt with the idea of enforcing arbitration clauses between 
two business entities of equal sophistication.62  Thirty-six years later, 
in 1989, the Court finally cemented its slow shift from skepticism of 
arbitration to the favorable attitude it harbors toward it today.63 
Construction matters offer a particularly salient backdrop for 
showcasing the Supreme Court‟s current preference for arbitration.  
In 1983, the Court first articulated its broad consent of the use of ar-
bitration over litigation in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Construction Corp.64  There, two parties, a contractor and a hos-
pital, entered into a contract which called for arbitration as the avenue 
for which to resolve disputes between them.65  Mercury, the contrac-
tor, attempted to initiate such an arbitration proceeding pursuant to its 
allegation that the hospital owed it damages for causing delays in 
construction.66  The hospital filed a lawsuit, however, to thwart Mer-
cury‟s attempt from initiating arbitration as delineated in the con-
tract.67  The hospital‟s main contentions were that, “Mercury‟s claim 
was without factual or legal basis and that it was barred by the statute 
of limitations[,]” and that “Mercury had lost any right to arbitration 
under the contract due to waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make 
a timely demand for arbitration,” and sought as relief “a declaration 
 
arbitration). 
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520-21 (1974) (ruling that, in a 
claim between the two American and German companies, arbitration in this international 
commercial context is favorable due to social policy concerns). 
63 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481 (“ „By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a 
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.‟ ”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
64 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
65 Id. at 4-5. 
66 Id. at 7. 
67 Id. 
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that there was no right to arbitration [and] a stay of arbitration.”68  
The Supreme Court ruled that because the growing trend was leaning 
toward favoring arbitration,69 laches and estoppel should be inter-
preted narrowly as defenses to arbitration, and that the arbitration 
provision would prevail.70 
In justifying its obtuse alignment with arbitration over the 
constitutionally-provided-for right to litigation, the Court expanded 
its 1967 decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufac-
turing Corp.,71 where it first determined that fraud in the inducement 
was an arbitrable issue according to the United States Arbitration 
Act.72  In Moses, the Court expounded on this basis, stating that: 
[Since Prima Paint Corp.,] courts of appeals have . . . 
consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability 
must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal 
policy favoring arbitration.  We agree.  The Arbitra-
tion Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the 
problem at hand is the construction of the contract 
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a 
like defense to arbitrability.73 
The Supreme Court of the United States allowed the lower courts to 
effectively dictate its ruling.  Commentators have astutely pointed 
out, however, that although federal policy “favoring arbitration” more 
accurately stands for the proposition that arbitration is a valuable al-
ternative, the Supreme Court here made it unambiguously clear that it 
supports the policy of favoring arbitration over litigation.74  Moreo-
 
68 Id. 
69 Moses, 460 U.S. at 24. 
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of 
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like de-
fense to arbitrability. 
Id. at 24-25. 
70 Id. 
71 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
72 Id. at 406 (“Federal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress with respect to 
matters-here, a contract involving commerce-over which it has legislative power.”). 
73 Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (emphasis added). 
74 Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 55, at 18. 
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ver, the Court stated that any hesitation of whether arbitration is ap-
propriate should nevertheless be tipped in its favor.75  Surely this is 
not the voice of reason or justice, nor one that could have been antic-
ipated by the founders of this nation.  Even so, the favor of arbitration 
remains the prevailing sentiment—one which is supported by not one 
scintilla of sound reasoning, but one that is nonetheless perpetuated 
by courts‟ reference to Moses. 
Once this ruling was handed down and it became clear that 
the Supreme Court favored arbitration, companies across the gamut 
started to implement arbitration clauses in their employment and con-
sumer contracts.76  Companies have since sought arbitration in order 
to escape the niceties of litigation—jury awards, punitive damages, 
meaningful discovery, class actions, and of course, publicity.77  
Moreover, companies design arbitration clauses that further curb the 
procedural and substantive rights of consumers and employees.78  For 
instance, some clauses have shortened statutes of limitations, others 
require claims to be filed in distant forums, and still others bar partic-
ular forms of relief (e.g., injunctive relief or attorney‟s fees).79 
State courts have followed suit, and the New York State legis-
lature, autonomous as it may be in the scheme of federal policy, does 
not legislate in a vacuum.  It undoubtedly takes into account the poli-
cy considerations of the federal government, as evidenced by the ar-
bitration provision of the prompt payment statute.  A legislature does 
not make laws it foresees will be overturned; it presumably contem-
plates the laws‟ consequences and enacts them responsibly.  Here, the 
statutorily mandated arbitration provision is the progeny of the feder-
al government‟s misguided philosophy that arbitration is favorable 
over litigation. 
The New York legislature passed the Prompt Payment statutes 
 
75 Moses, 460 U.S. at 26 & n.34.  Yet, the Court acknowledges that: 
[t]he Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-
court jurisdiction.  It creates a body of federal substantive law establish-
ing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does 
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) or otherwise. 
Id. at 26 n.32. 
76 Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1638 (noting that “busi-
nesses jumped on the opportunity” to force arbitration in contexts that previously might not 
have been enforced). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1641. 
79 Id. at 1641-42. 
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with provisions mandating arbitration because the national trend had 
been leaning in that direction in recent years.80  This trend is largely 
due to the Supreme Court perpetuating a skewed interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  When Congress enacted the FAA 
in 1925, the original intention was to allow two parties of equal so-
phistication to engage in arbitration instead of litigation.81  The Court, 
however, has since interpreted the FAA to mean that it allows large, 
sophisticated companies to take advantage of less powerful parties 
who have no choice but to adhere to the former‟s contracts in a “take 
it or leave it” fashion.82  Admittedly, the enforcement of agreements 
between parties of the same sophistication that bargain for arbitration 
as the means by which to resolve their disputes is not problematic.  
To imagine, however, that a legislature would enact a statute that 
practicably mandates arbitration is an unfortunate legal reality dis-
connected from rationality. 
A.  The Seventh Amendment and New York’s Analog 
State courts have enforced mandatory arbitration agreements 
as if the agreements were between two voluntary parties.83  Similarly, 
the Prompt Payment Law compels parties into arbitration from 
agreements that merely contemplated litigation.  This imposition of 
arbitration is unconstitutional because it deprives the party of the 
right to a hearing by jury under the Seventh Amendment and its New 
York analog.84 
The Seventh Amendment challenge can only be made if the 
case is brought in federal court, under common law, and for damages 
of twenty dollars or more.85  To call on a state‟s Seventh Amendment 
 
80 See, e.g., Moses, 460 U.S. at 24 (noting the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements”). 
81 See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 36, at 1636 (“Until quite 
recently, . . . arbitration agreements were not used by U.S. businesses to require consumers, 
employees, franchisees, or other weaker parties to resolve disputes through private arbitra-
tion rather than in court.”). 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 1642 (noting that courts are not persuaded by the fact that arbitration agree-
ments with small print or in a form contract constitute grounds for nullifying them); see also 
Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing the validi-
ty of the contract in question wherein the arbitration clause was in fine print and inconspi-
cuously placed toward the back and bottom of the agreement). 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
85 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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analog, the challenger must further ensure that the Federal Arbitration 
Act does not preempt the relevant state statute.86 
The New York State Constitution provides that “[t]rial by jury 
in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitu-
tional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be 
waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed 
by law.”87  The State Constitution further provides that “[t]he legisla-
ture may enact laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, 
content, manner and time of presentation of the instrument effectuat-
ing such waiver.”88  Notwithstanding the Constitution‟s permission to 
the legislature in delineating statutory waiver requirements, there is 
no statute that expressly defines the criteria for which a waiver of 
jury trial in civil cases must be obtained.89  New York courts, howev-
er, as well as most other state and federal courts, have prescribed the 
manner with which the right to a jury trial in civil cases may be 
waived.90  The waiver of a civil jury trial must be clear, unequivocal, 
and explicit so as to leave no room for uncertainty regarding the par-
ties‟ intentions.91 
The Prompt Payment Law requires that written notice be giv-
en of the complaint the aggrieved party has against the other party, 
and that after such notice is given, “the parties shall attempt to re-
solve the matter giving rise to such complaint.”92  The written notice 
must be delivered, with third-party verification, to the last business 
address known to the party giving notice of the complaint.93  The 
question remains whether this effectuates a waiver as defined by the 
courts.  It is doubtful that a mere letter of complaint by one party to 
 
86 Sternlight, supra note 36, at 1646. 
87 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). 
88 Id. 
89 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4101 (MCKINNEY 2010) lists the actions for which issues of fact shall 
be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived.  They are: (1) where a party is able to prove a 
judgment for a sum of money; (2) for “an action of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for ab-
atement of and damages for a nuisance; to recover a chattel”; (3) any other action provided 
for by the New York Constitution.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4101(1)-(3).  Waiver of jury trial in 
criminal cases is governed by N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 320.10 (McKinney 2010). 
90 Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitution for 
the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 25 (1991) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rise and Spread]. 
91 Edsaid Realty Corp. v. Samuels, 92 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949) (“While 
parties may unquestionably, by agreement, waive the constitutional right of trial by jury in 
civil cases, the waiver must be clear and explicit, and must leave no room for doubt as to the 
intention of the parties.”) (emphasis added). 
92 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756(b)(3)(a). 
93 Id. § 756 (b)(3)(b). 
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another constitutes waiver of a jury trial for the other party, but the 
subsequent provision of the Prompt Payment Law introduces the ar-
bitration provision: “the aggrieved party may refer the matter, not 
less than fifteen days of the receipt of third party verification of deli-
very of the complaint, to the American Arbitration Association for an 
expedited arbitration pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitra-
tion Association.”94  The party who was served with the letter is thus 
placed in an inferior position because the “aggrieved” party has at its 
disposal the statutory mandate to arbitrate.  As one commentator put 
it, “there is a great difference between a legislature mandating arbi-
tration and a private company doing the same.”95 
B.  Framework for Arbitration in New York Practice: 
Article 75 
Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) de-
fines the scope of arbitration between private contracting parties and 
allows for judicial oversight over the process.96  Prior to the enact-
ment of Article 75 of the CPLR in 1920, there existed a judicial hos-
tility toward arbitration among the courts.97  Thus, the advent of 
CPLR Article 75 ushered in an era of refreshed judicial philosophy, 
one that welcomed the new procedural guidelines that made arbitra-
tion more attractive.  As a result, the Court of Appeals, mirroring its 
federal counterpart,98 now favors arbitration as the best alternative to 
the judicial forum for dispute resolution.99  Part of the appeal for arbi-
tration is that it results in expeditious resolutions that are often less 
 
94 Id. § 756 (b)(3)(c). 
95 Sternlight, supra note 36, at 1647. 
96 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511 (explaining how a party can vacate or modify an arbitration 
award as determined by a judge). 
97 See, e.g., Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 654-55 (N.Y. 1914). 
[A] distinction [has been] made between the provisions of a contract 
providing that before a right of action shall accrue certain facts shall be 
determined, or amounts or values ascertained, and an independent cove-
nant or agreement to provide for the adjustment and settlement of all 
disputes and differences by arbitration to the exclusion of the courts. 
Id. at 654. 
98 See, e.g., Moses, 460 U.S. at 24. 
99 Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47 (N.Y. 1973) (“The result we suggest in this case is 
consistent with the policy adopted by the Federal courts, and is significant since the Federal 
arbitration statute is almost identical to, and is derived from, our own arbitration statute.”). 
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expensive and more private.100 
Notwithstanding the extreme favorability for arbitration, there 
exists a tension between the disadvantages it places on parties—
resulting from the surrendering of significant procedural rights intrin-
sic in arbitration—with any recognized benefits.  In Silverman v. 
Benmor Coats, Inc.,101 for example, the Court of Appeals is dishear-
tened that, 
[A]bsent [a] provision in the arbitration clause itself, 
an arbitrator is not bound by principles of substantive 
law or by rules of evidence.  He may do justice as he 
sees it, applying his own sense of law and equity to the 
facts as he finds them to be and making an award re-
flecting the spirit rather than the letter of the agree-
ment, even though the award exceeds the remedy re-
quested by the parties.  His award will not be vacated 
even though the court concludes that his interpretation 
of the agreement misconstrues or disregards its plain 
meaning or misapplies substantive rules of law, unless 
it is violative of a strong public policy, or is totally ir-
rational, or exceeds a specifically enumerated limita-
tion on his power.  Nor will an arbitration award be 
vacated on “ „the mere possibility‟ ” that it violates an 
express limitation on the arbitrator‟s power.102 
Through this excerpt of Silverman, it is clear that the New 
York Court of Appeals substantially mirrored its apprehension to-
ward arbitration as the Supreme Court did in Wilko 31 years earlier.  
Therefore, due to the substantial curbing of procedural rights, courts 
still serve a chaperoning function when a party calls for judicial in-
tervention.  When a party solicits the involvement of a court, the law 
addresses these preliminary threshold issues: whether there actually 
was a valid arbitration agreement that contemplated the matters to be 
arbitrated;103 whether the applicable statute of limitations has 
 
100 Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 646 (N.Y. 1989) (“Although a 
party gives up an important right when it agrees to submit a dispute to arbitration, such pro-
ceedings are not less effective in discovering the truth than are judicial proceedings and it is 
not, as a matter of public policy, per se unfair to give one party the right to select them.”). 
101 461 N.E.2d 1261 (N.Y. 1984). 
102 Id. at 1266 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Matter of Tilbury Fabrics v. Stillwater, 
Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1093, 1094 (N.Y. 1982)). 
103 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503(a) (MCKINNEY 2010) (“Where there is no substantial question 
18
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lapsed;104 whether the award was procured through “corrupt, fraud or 
misconduct”;105 and the impartiality of the arbitrator106 or the arbitra-
tor exceeding his authority.107  This list is illustrative rather than ex-
haustive, as the courts also take into consideration whether the issue 
is arbitrable as per prevailing public policy. 
Perhaps the principal concern courts must first grapple with 
before compelling parties to arbitrate is to determine if, in fact, there 
existed such an agreement to arbitrate.  A higher degree of scrutiny is 
required for arbitration agreements as compared to ordinary con-
tracts.108  The Court of Appeals has stated that: 
[t]he reason for this requirement, quite simply, is that 
by agreeing to arbitrate a party waives in large part 
many of his normal rights under the procedural and 
substantive law of the State, and it would be unfair to 
infer such a significant waiver on the basis of anything 
less than a clear indication of intent.109 
Thus, the Court of Appeals would agree that certain sacro-
sanct rights are taken away from parties who arbitrate disputes, and 
that opaqueness of terms in an agreement to arbitrate makes it inhe-
rently ineffective.  For these reasons, an agreement to arbitrate must 
be “express, direct, and unequivocal as to the issues or disputes to be 
submitted to arbitration.  But, once there is agreement or submission 
to arbitration, the scope of the arbitrators is unlimited and, with very 
limited exceptions, unreviewable.”110  Consequently, the power 
 
whether a valid agreement was made or complied with . . . .”). 
104 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7502(b) (MCKINNEY 2010) (“If, at the time that a demand for arbitra-
tion was made or a notice of intention to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbi-
trated would have been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the 
state, a party may assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration . . . .”). 
105 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(i) (McKinney 2010). 
106 Id. § 7511(b)(1)(ii). 
107 Id. § 7511(b)(1)(iii). 
108 See, e.g., Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. 
1978) (“It has long been the rule in this State that the parties to a commercial transaction 
„will not be held to have chosen arbitration as the forum for the resolution of their disputes in 
the absence of an express, unequivocal agreement to that effect; absent such an explicit 
commitment neither party may be compelled to arbitrate.‟ ” (quoting Matter of Acting Supt. 
of Schools of Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Assn.), 369 N.E.2d 746, 
748 (N.Y. 1977)). 
109 Id. 
110 Gangel v. N. DeGroot, PVBA, 362 N.E.2d 249, 250 (N.Y. 1977) (citing Weinrott v. 
Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, 46 (N.Y. 1973)). 
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vested with the arbitration process is so potent that it is not something 
that should be wielded menacingly by powerful parties, nor used as 
leverage to manipulate opponents, as a means of procuring a resolu-
tion through a process which is intrinsically less stringent.  Perhaps 
more importantly, a legislature should not mandatorily impose arbi-
tration on any party, as the New York legislature does with the 
Prompt Payment Law. 
In construing arbitration clauses, courts have balanced the le-
gality of the arbitration clause in the context of the entire contract—
that is to say, whether the clause is valid.  The issue of validity arises 
most often with contracts that contain very broad arbitration clauses.  
The leading New York case on the issue is Weinrott v. Carp,111 where 
the Court of Appeals held that arbitration clauses are separable from 
the contract in its entirety if portions of the contract were found to be 
invalid.112  The contention in Weinrott was that because the overall 
contract was induced by fraud, so too should the arbitration clause be 
struck down as fraudulent.113  The Court, however, provided that: 
The CPLR arbitration provisions (CPLR 7501 et seq.) 
evidence a legislative intent to encourage arbitration.  
Certainly the avoidance of court litigation to save the 
time and resources of both the courts and the parties 
involved make this a worthwhile goal.  One way to 
encourage the use of the arbitration forum would be to 
prevent parties to such agreements from using the 
courts as a vehicle to protract litigation.  This conduct 
has the effect of frustrating both the initial intent of the 
parties as well as legislative policy.  In the case at bar, 
there were 21 hearings and 2,750 pages of testimony.  
 
111 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 1973). 
112 Id. at 47 (“[W]e now hold that an arbitration provision of a contract is separable, the 
agreement to arbitrate would be „valid‟ even if the substantive portions of the contract were 
induced by fraud.”). 
113 Id.  Notice the Court‟s tone when addressing appellant‟s legal contention: 
As often happens in this type of case, appellants moved to stay the arbi-
tration on the ground that there was fraud in the inducement of the con-
tract.  Although appellants‟ contention was „not supported by the record 
and is refuted by documentary evidence‟, the arbitration continued to be 
stayed while that preliminary issue laboriously worked its way through 
the New York court system.  Finally, after the issue fell exhausted at the 
Court of Appeals, the arbitration hearings commenced. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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If not for the arbitration, that entire burden would have 
been placed on our court system.  Indeed, had the case 
been tried in the formality of the courtroom, it would 
have taken longer to dispose of than it did before the 
arbitrators.  A broad arbitration clause should be given 
the full effect of its wording in order to implement the 
intention of the parties.  Of course, where a form con-
tract is involved or an arbitration provision seems to 
be less than broad, a court should give the provision 
and the circumstances surrounding its inclusion in the 
contract great scrutiny.  As a general rule, however, 
under a broad arbitration provision the claim of fraud 
in the inducement should be determined by arbitra-
tors.114 
With that ruling, the Court of Appeals thus aligned New 
York‟s arbitration policy with that of the Federal government‟s.115  
This ruling effectively means that the validity of the agreement re-
ferred to in CPLR 7503(a) and (b) relates only to the arbitration pro-
vision itself, and not with the contract as a whole, on account of the 
arbitration provision‟s severability.  Ultimately, this means that an 
arbitration provision in an invalid contract will be given effect irres-
pective of the alleged invalidity or illegality of substantive portions of 
a contract.116  The Court defends its holding by stating that any con-
trary ruling would defeat the twin aims of arbitration: “speed and fi-
nality.”117 
 
114 Id. at 47-48. 
115 Weinrott, 298 N.E.2d at 47 (holding that “[t]he result we suggest in this case is consis-
tent with the policy adopted by the Federal courts.”). 
116 Id. at 46. 
When the parties to a contract have reposed in arbitrators all questions 
concerning the „validity, interpretation or enforcement‟ of their agree-
ment, they have selected their tribunal and no doubt they intend it to de-
termine the contract's „validity‟ should the necessity arise.  Judicial in-
tervention, based upon a nonseparability contract theory in arbitration 
matters prolongs litigation, and defeats, as this case conclusively demon-
strates, two of arbitration's primary virtues, speed and finality. 
Id. at 47. 
117 Id. 
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C.  Article 75 and the Federal Arbitration Act: In 
Cahoots? 
The preference of the United States Supreme Court, Congress, 
the New York Court of Appeals, and the New York legislature for 
arbitration over litigation is inherently unconstitutional.  Never did 
our framers envision the privatization of our justice system, and yet 
mandatory arbitration is the most favored mechanism by which to 
dispense it, at both the federal and state level. 
The concept that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is su-
preme and thus preempts certain state laws is not a novel one.118  Yet 
the boundaries of FAA preemption are not obvious, and while the 
Supreme Court has held that the FAA does not cover the entire field 
of arbitration, it does, in fact, preempt state laws that frustrate the 
FAA‟s objectives.119  It would therefore seem imprudent for a state 
legislature to enact laws contrary to the FAA.  Moreover, so long as 
the FAA covers the particular arbitration field in question, it does not 
matter whether the case is brought in federal or state court.120  The 
Court has differentiated between cases where state laws have invali-
dated arbitration clauses on the basis of unconscionability or fraud,121 
and state laws that substantively and procedurally invalidate arbitra-
tion contracts.122 
The New York Court of Appeals acknowledges this relation-
ship and has held that “[a] further basic principle . . . is the corollary 
tenet that, in situations where the FAA is applicable, it preempts State 
law on the subject of the enforceability of arbitration clauses.”123  The 
FAA is unique in that it does not grant exclusive jurisdictional au-
thority to the federal courts, thus enabling non-diverse claimants to 
 
118 Sternlight, Rise and Spread, supra note 90, at 35.  The author points out that while 
those who oppose mandatory arbitration argue that it infringes on state constitutional jury 
trial rights, supporters of arbitration argue that the FAA nevertheless preempts certain state 
constitutional rights.  Id.  The author argues, however, that, “it would be inappropriate to 
hold that the FAA preempts general jury trial waiver provisions.”  Id. 
119 Id. at 35-36 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989)). 
120 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1987) (“ „We see nothing in the 
[Federal Arbitration] Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to 
any additional limitations under state law.‟ ” (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 
1, 11 (1984))). 
121 See, e.g., Doctor‟s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
122 Sternlight, Rise and Spread, supra note 90, at 36. 
123 Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (N.Y. 1993). 
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rely on the FAA in state court.124 
Nevertheless, the broad scope with which the FAA is applied 
should be viewed with skepticism and caution.  This federal act 
should not be construed in a manner so broad that it would preempt 
even state constitutional protections, namely the right to a jury trial.  
The inherent right to a jury trial and arbitration must be viewed in 
harmony and not with the mindset that they have competing interests.  
Ultimately, the excessive favor for arbitration should be balanced, 
and perhaps curtailed, with the deference that is due to New York‟s 
constitutional guarantee to a jury trial. 
A prime example comes from Montana in Kloss v. Edward D. 
Jones & Co.,125 where the Montana Supreme Court prevented the 
preemption of Montana law by the FAA on the basis that a contrac-
tual waiver of basic constitutional guarantees was one which applied 
in various contexts, not merely in the construction of arbitration pro-
visions.126  Thus, the Montana law was construed broadly, as a gener-
al provision, and was not preempted by the FAA.127  So too should 
New York law be interpreted. 
By interpreting the FAA the way the Supreme Court currently 
does, it perpetuates a philosophy that is counter to the underlying 
constitutional principles that founded this nation: the right to jury tri-
al, due process in courts of law, and neutral, unbiased judges.128 
D.  Sheer Nature of Statute Creates a State Action 
In order to establish “state action” for implicating arbitration 
on due process grounds, there must be evidence proffered that a fed-
eral or state government directly aided in a constitutional violation.129  
Thus, it is obvious that when a state statute is questioned, like the 
Prompt Payment Law is here, there is no need for a scrupulous ex-
amination of the circumstances that give rise to the violation because 
 
124 See Moses, 460 U.S. at 25. 
125 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002). 
126 Id. at 15-16. 
127 Id. at 16 (“The Supreme Court has . . . held . . . that if a state law governs . . . the valid-
ity, revocability and enforceability of contracts in general then generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
agreements without contravening Section 2 of the FAA.”). 
128 Sternlight, supra note 55, at 10. 
129 Id. at 40. 
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the source is readily apparent.130  In the instant controversy, the 
Prompt Payment Law expressly permits private parties with contracts 
valued at $150,000 or higher to engage in binding arbitration.131  Sta-
tutory compulsion to arbitrate is state action and is a violation of con-
stitutional canons as delineated in the due process clauses of the State 
Constitution132 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution.133 
There exists among the Supreme Court jurisprudence a ple-
thora of cases that hold when the conduct of private entities are so 
entwined with the actions of public institutions that the private con-
duct may be deemed state action.134 State legislatures that pass laws 
impressing arbitration on parties does indeed constitute state action, 
and the Prompt Payment Law is a manifestation of a deliberate and 
meticulous attempt by the state to deter parties from exercising their 
constitutional rights.  Congress enacts laws, which is a direct form of 
state action, but in the same vein, the Supreme Court espouses its pre-
ference for arbitration over litigation through its jurisprudence, also a 
manifestation of state action.135  Therefore, a colorable argument ex-
ists for state action on behalf of the legislature and the judiciary re-
garding the overt favorability of arbitration on both the federal and 
state levels. 
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc.136 is a telling case where 
the New York Court of Appeals held that certain provisions of the 
Lien Law failed to comport with “traditional notions of procedural 
due process embodied in the State Constitution, as they deprive[d] 
 
130 Id. 
131 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756(b)(3)(c) (“If efforts to resolve such matter to the satisfac-
tion of all parties are unsuccessful, the aggrieved party may refer the matter . . . to the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association for an expedited arbitration . . . .”). 
132 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
133 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
134 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 933 (1982) (holding that where a 
state statute authorized a private party to commandeer private property with the assistance of 
a public official, the private party had a colorable claim against him under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 
726 (1961) (holding that a private restaurant was so intimately linked to a public parking fa-
cility that the restaurant's denial of service to African-American patrons was forbidden under 
the Constitution).  But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978) (holding 
that no state action existed where a private warehouse used self-help to recoup monies owed 
it). 
135 See, e.g., Moses, 460 U.S. 1, 29 (“[T]he Court acted within its authority in deciding the 
legal issues presented in order to facilitate the prompt arbitration that Congress envisaged.”). 
136 379 N.E.2d 1169 (N.Y. 1978). 
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the owner of the vehicle of a significant property interest without 
providing any opportunity to be heard.”137  Sharrock‟s husband had 
taken her Cadillac to the defendant, Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., to re-
place the engine for a total of $225.138  There was no mention of the 
storage charges that Sharrock would incur should the car not be 
picked up immediately.139  Meanwhile, the original engine that was 
installed was defective and had to be replaced, but by that time Shar-
rock‟s husband had been hospitalized and he was unable to continue 
communicating with the shop with regard to the repair of the car.140  
Soon thereafter, plaintiff received a “Notice of Lien and Sale” pur-
suant to the Lien Law.141  After storage fees brought the price of the 
repair up to $502, plaintiff was urged to pay the price or sell the ve-
hicle, which prompted the suit.142 
The Court of Appeals held that in order to determine whether 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated, 
the pivotal issue was whether the State involved itself in what would 
have otherwise been private action.143  Private conduct alone does not 
qualify as state action, no matter how reprehensible the conduct.144  
There must be a sufficient relation and nexus between the conduct 
and a public entity so as to call upon the state action doctrine.145  The 
Court cautioned, however, that “the mere fact that an activity might 
not constitute State action for purposes of the Federal Constitution 
does not perforce necessitate that the same conclusion be reached 
when that conduct is claimed to be violative of the State Constitu-
tion.”146  Indeed, it found that the garageman‟s conduct did not vi-
olate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it 
 
137 Id. at 1171. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1171. 
142 Id. at 1171-72. 
143 Id. at 1172 (“The threshold question in any judicial inquiry into conduct claimed to be 
violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is whether the State has in 
some fashion involved itself in what, in another setting, would otherwise be deemed private 
activity.”). 
144 Id. (“Purely private conduct, however egregious or unreasonable, does not rise to the 
level of constitutional significance absent a significant nexus between the State and the ac-
tors or the conduct.”). 
145 Id. (“[I]t is settled that where the impetus for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is 
private, the State must have „significantly involved itself‟ in order for that action to fall with-
in the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted). 
146 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173. 
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did in fact offend the due process clause of the New York Constitu-
tion.147 
After clarifying the difference between the State Constitu-
tion‟s due process clause with that of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the Federal Constitution, the Court wrote: 
State Constitutions in general, and the New York Con-
stitution in particular, have long safeguarded any 
threat to individual liberties, irrespective of from what 
quarter that peril arose. Thus, as early as 1843, Justice 
Bronson, in speaking of the due process clause of our 
State Constitution, noted: “The meaning of the section 
then seems to be, that no member of the state shall be 
disfranchised, or deprived of any of his rights and pri-
vileges, unless the matter be adjudged against him 
upon trial and according to the course of the common 
law.  It must be ascertained judicially that he has for-
feited his privileges, or that some one [sic] else has a 
superior title to the property he possesses, before ei-
ther of them can be taken from him.”148 
The Court determined that the Constitutional protections afforded by 
the New York Constitution were triggered when there was no judicial 
oversight of the conduct of the garageman for which the Lien Law 
permitted him disposal of Sharrock‟s property without adequate no-
tice to Sharrock.149  The State, the Court held, had so entwined itself 
with the private actor, here the garageman, that the Court was com-
pelled to deem the provisions of the Lien Law as unconstitutional.150 
 
147 Id.  The Court reasoned that: 
[T]he mere fact that an activity might not constitute State action for pur-
poses of the Federal Constitution does not perforce necessitate that the 
same conclusion be reached when that conduct is claimed to be violative 
of the State Constitution.  Indeed, on innumerable occasions this court 
has given our State Constitution an independent construction, affording 
the rights and liberties of the citizens of this State even more protection 
than may be secured under the United States Constitution. 
Id. 
148 Id. at 1174 (quoting Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140, 146 (1843)). 
149 Id. 
150 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1174 (reasoning that state action, as manifested by the Lien 
Law, “compels the conclusion that New York has so entwined itself into the debtor-creditor 
relationship as to constitute sufficient and meaningful State participation which triggers the 
protections afforded by our Constitution”). 
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Thus, so too should the Court of Appeals render section 756-b 
of the Prompt Payment Law unconstitutional.  Forcing arbitration is a 
direct violation of both the Federal and State constitutions because it 
deprives the parties of their day in court by obliging one party to 
force the other to arbitrate.  In addition to the Prompt Payment Law 
being a violation of the Due Process Clause of both the Federal and 
State Constitutions, the next section will expound upon how the arbi-
tration provision of the statute is unconstitutionally vague with regard 
to waiver of the right to jury trial. 
What Constitutes Waiver of Jury Trial? 
The right to a jury trial is fundamental, both under federal and 
state law.151  The Supreme Court established a four-prong test to de-
termine when there is a valid constitutional right in civil matters.152  
These factors are derived from Fuentes v. Shevin,153 where the Court 
scrutinized the clarity of the waiver of the right to jury trial,154 the so-
phistication of the parties,155 whether the waiver was voluntary,156 
and the substantive fairness of the waiver.157  Although New York 
has similar considerations regarding the waiver of jury trial in civil 
and criminal contexts,158 these factors should be at the forefront of the 
discussion with respect to the Prompt Payment Law notice-provision. 
The waiver of constitutional rights by the courts is dealt with 
in an apathetic manner.  The New York Constitution states that a civil 
jury trial may be waived by “the manner to be prescribed by law.”159  
Yet the legislature has not created a statute expressly discussing the 
manner with which one can waive the right to jury trial in civil cases.  
The prerequisite for arbitration according to General Business Law 
 
151 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
152 Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 55, at 57-58. 
153 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
154 Id. at 95-96 (dismissing waiver that was in fine print where party failed to explain why 
there could not be a hearing). 
155 Id. at 95 (declining waiver where parties had unequal bargaining power). 
156 Id. at 95-96 (rejecting waiver for which sale was allegedly conditioned upon). 
157 Id. at 95 (highlighting the importance of whether the party received anything in return 
for the waiver). 
158 People v. Page, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (N.Y. 1996) (“The history of the constitutional 
waiver provision thus establishes that the requirement that the defendant execute a signed, 
written waiver was considered critical to securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiv-
er of the right to trial by jury.”). 
159 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
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section 756-b is for the aggrieved party to notify the other party by a 
written notice.160 
It is unclear what the receiving party must do with the notice 
if it does not wish to arbitrate, or if the party is silent altogether.  The 
intent of the legislature regarding the written notice required under 
section 756-b is unknown.  If the written notice is intended to act as a 
waiver of jury trial rights, this is simply inadequate because the pro-
vision of the statute merely requires that the written notice contain 
the details of the complaint.161  There is no mention of a waiver of 
jury trial for the receiving party.  Yet the statute continues on to pro-
vide for arbitration at the behest of the aggrieved party, which has the 
effect of backing the other party into a corner.  Since arbitrators are 
given great deference, and absent any blatant misconduct during the 
proceeding, there is little a protesting party can do once the arbitra-
tion proceeding has commenced. 
The arbitration provision of the statute is an exemplification 
of misconduct by the New York State government, thereby qualifying 
the statute as state action in violation of the Due Process Clause and 
the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Constitution.  Furthermore, 
in evaluating arbitration provisions, courts should presume against 
waiver when constitutional rights are involved, unless it is explicit 
and clear that the party is waiving his right.162  New York courts fol-
low the same presumption.163  It is therefore irrational to assume that 
a simple written notification of a complaint by the aggrieved party to 
the other is a waiver of the other party‟s constitutional right to a jury 
trial.  If the contract between the parties is silent as to conflict resolu-
tion, and the aggrieved party sends notice of arbitration in accordance 
with the statute, what is the extent to which the party needs to ac-
quiesce?  What if the party who is served with the notice does not 
consent to arbitrate?  There is nothing in the statute that states the ar-
bitration must be consensual—may the matter then proceed to litiga-
tion if it is not?  These are but a few uncertainties, the answers for 
which the Prompt Payment Law does not provide. 
 
 
160 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756-b(3)(b). 
161 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 756-b(3)(a)-(c). 
162 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 94-95, 95 n.31. 
163 Edsaid Realty Corp., 92 N.Y.S.2d at 899. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Binding arbitration is not without purpose in the twenty-first 
century.  When parties agree to be bound by alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms to resolve disputes, it is indeed a swift means for 
reaching a conclusion.  Nevertheless, it is of utmost importance that, 
in the context the Prompt Payment Law, we do not allow legislatures 
to statutorily impose mandatory binding arbitration. 
Courts, unlike legislatures, have a natural inclination to “pre-
fer” and “favor” arbitration over litigation because of the caseload it 
deflects from their dockets.  While that is not a wholly illegitimate 
reason, it flirts dangerously close with overlooking many unconstitu-
tional arbitration clauses and statutes simply by virtue of courts fa-
voring them.  It is imperative that society put this issue on the fore-
front of legal discourse so that statutorily mandated arbitration does 
not pervade other aspects of the law that intimately affect our lives—
lest we forget that arbitration is not consensual when parties are man-
dated by the government to partake in it. 
In summation, the Due Process Clause of both the Federal and 
New York Constitutions are violated by the Prompt Payment Law, as 
well as the parties‟ right to a jury trial, also guaranteed by both con-
stitutions.  The Prompt Payment Law represents multiple constitu-
tional violations under the guise and guile of lessening the influx of 
cases in the court system, but does so at the expense of parties‟ con-
stitutional rights.  The implications of this legislation, and all like it, 
are profound: this republican society in which we live, and the capita-
listic tenet by which it is propelled is lessened by such governmental 
regulation to the extent that it will not endure long after government 
dictates the intimate matters of private parties in contract. 
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